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*  Hon. Anita B. Brody, United States District Court for the
              Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 05-1916
            
LAWRENCE M. STREMBA,
                                             Appellant
       v.
* JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
   (*Substituted pursuant to FRAP Rule 43(c))
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No.01-cv-01066)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 28, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and BRODY,* District Judge
(Filed:  February 28, 2006)
OPINION
            
2SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Lawrence M. Stremba (“Stremba”) appeals from the order and judgment of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, affirming the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Stremba’s application for
disability benefits.  The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing at which
Stremba was represented by counsel and found that Stremba was not disabled on or
before March 31, 1999, the date he was last insured for disability purposes. 
The ALJ evaluated Stremba’s claim using the five-step test set out in 20 C.F.R. § 
404.1520.  Stremba, who was born in 1949, graduated from high school, and was
previously employed as a truck-driver and laborer.  The evidence shows Stremba has
dysthymia, substance abuse in remission, borderline intellectual functioning, degenerative
disc disease of L3/4 and L4/5 and radiculopathy.  The ALJ determined Stremba’s
impairments to be severe when considered in combination, but not severe enough to
preclude substantial gainful activity.  At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that
Stremba’s impairments imposed physical limitations that prevented him from performing
any of his past relevant work.  However, after hearing evidence from an impartial
psychological expert and a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Stremba retained
the capacity to perform light unskilled work such as a machine tender, a hand trimmer, a
parking lot attendant, a cashier, and a counter attendant, all of which are jobs that the ALJ
found exist in significant numbers in the national economy.  
Although the evidence showed that Stremba was not to climb, crawl, reach above
3shoulder level, push or pull with the lower extremities, and that he should avoid
temperature extremes, excessive vibrations, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation,
and hazards such as unprotected heights and moving machinery, he retained the capacity
to lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 pounds occasionally, provided he
alternated sitting or standing at will.  The ALJ also took into account Stremba’s
borderline intellectual functioning and limited him to simple, routine, and repetitive type
jobs.
In spite of his complaints, Stremba is able to perform light household chores, cook,
drive, and watch television.  The ALJ found Stremba’s subjective complaints to be
overstated and not wholly reliable.  Accordingly, The ALJ found Stremba was not
disabled.  The Appeals Council denied Mr. Stremba’s request for review, making the
ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Stremba filed a civil action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final
decision.  The Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending that the Commissioner’s
decision be affirmed, and the District Court issued a memorandum and order granting the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.
Stremba raises two issues on appeal to this court.  He contends that his
impairments medically equal a listed impairment because the medical expert testified
without contradiction that Stremba’s impairments equal listing 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.05.  Stremba also argues that the ALJ erred when he
formulated the hypothetical question to the vocational expert, where the ALJ failed to
4include the stipulation that if Stremba had to be retrained, he would be disabled in
psychiatric terms, as testified to by the medical expert.
Stremba’s first contention is that the combination of his back distress along with
his lower IQ equals a listing 12.05 of mental retardation.  He relies on the opinion by Dr.
Anthony Galdieri, the impartial psychological expert, who testified that Stremba met or
equaled listing 12.05.
In order for a claimant to prove medical equivalence under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1526(a), s/he must proffer medical findings which are equal in severity to all the
criteria for the one most similar listed impairment.  Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530-
531 (1990).  “An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how
severely, does not qualify.”  Id.   Section 12.05 of Subpart P, Appendix 1, defining mental
retardation, has essentially two parts.  In the first part, a claimant must prove “subaverage
general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning” manifesting before
age 22.  In the second part, the claimant must show that any one of  four criteria satisfies
the required severity.
Here, Stremba has produced no evidence that his mental impairment manifested
before age 22 as required under the first part of § 12.05.  Moreover, none of the results of
the IQ tests that Stremba has taken show a valid verbal performance or full scale IQ of
below 71.  Thus, he is precluded from claiming incapacity under any of the four criteria. 
Moreover, the ALJ did not find that Stremba suffered from marked restriction of activities
of daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning, marked difficulties
5in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration.  Because the ALJ has final responsibility for
the determination of whether a claimant’s impairments meets or equals the requirements
of any impairments in appendix 1, § 404.1527(e)(2), and because the ALJ’s determination
is supported by substantial evidence, we will uphold his determination in this respect.
Stremba’s second contention is that the ALJ erred when he formulated the
hypothetical question to the vocational expert.  Stremba argues that the ALJ failed to
include a limitation based on Dr. Galdieri’s opinion that if Stremba had to be retrained, he
would be disabled in psychiatric terms.  This contention, too, fails.
A “vocational expert’s testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to perform
alternative employment may only be considered for purposes of determining disability if
the question accurately portrays the claimant’s individual physical and mental
impairments.”  Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F. 2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).  In order for the
hypothetical to be an “accurate[] portray[al],” it must reflect all of the claimant’s
impairments.  Id.  However, “all impairments” means only those that are medically
established.  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Limitations that
are medically supported but are also contradicted by other evidence in the record may or
may not be found credible.”  Id.  Of course, credibility determinations are to be made by
the ALJ.  See § 404.1527.
Stremba’s contention here is closely related to his contention above.  Dr. Galdieri’s
opinion was that Stremba’s borderline intelligence coupled with medical issues that
6would prevent him from doing what he had done in the past would constitute a disability
if he had to be retrained.  This was a medical opinion of impairment under § 12.05. 
However, Dr. Galdieri’s testimony is not medically supported.  Indeed, the testimony of
Stremba’s own psychologists points to the conclusion that, although he is a slow learner
with a borderline IQ, there is nothing about a retraining period for a new job that would
result in a psychiatric disability.  Ultimately, the final determination of impairment under
§ 12.05 is a legal one, not a medical one.  Once the ALJ had determined that Stremba’s
impairment did not meet or equal the requirements of § 12.05,  there was no need for him
to include Dr. Galdieri’s opinion about Stremba’s disability under that provision in the
hypothetical to the vocational expert.
Because our review of the record persuades us that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s determination that Stremba is not disabled under the meaning of the Act, we
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
_______________________
                    
